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Sidman addresses two very impor-
tant questions in Equivalence Relations
and Behavior." A Research Story: What
are the bases of behavioral compe-
tence? And how do units of learning
become related? His book is not a tra-
ditional treatise on topics of condition-
ing, behavior modification, or how be-
havior comes to be controlled by spe-
cific stimuli. Rather, it is about how
new relations emerge so as to provide
the foundations for basic competence
for "words and other symbols versus
things and events" (p. 2). His chal-
lenge is to account for the transition
whereby stimuli, which initially are ar-
bitrary, come to be associated with ref-
erents and thereby acquire what is
called meaning, in common parlance.
Notwithstanding common usage, Sid-
man eschews all cognitive connota-
Sidman, M. (1994). Equivalence relations
and behavior: A research story. Boston, MA:
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tions for the word meaning, and de-
fines it as a special instance of word-
referent equivalence "culled from ev-
eryday experience" (p. 7).
Sidman likens his challenge to that
of accounting for induction, which he
holds to be a behavioral, not a logical,
process (p. 16). Through use of proce-
dures whereby the subject is given one
stimulus, A, associated with B, and B,
in turn, is related by similar procedures
to Stimulus C, Sidman then asks
whether "equivalence relations" are
present. If there are equivalence rela-
tions, A will relate to "C, C to A and
to B, B to A, A to itself, B to itself, C
to itself" (p. 16). In sum, the relations
that emerge have not been the target of
specific reinforcement in the subject's
training history. They have been in-
duced---or produced by Sidman's par-
adigm.
The book recounts the story of how
an understanding of emergent relations
and competencies was achieved
through studies in his teaching-re-
search program with mentally retarded
subjects. Although children normally
accrue vast networks of relations be-
tween stimuli and events, those with
mental retardation typically do not.
Consequently, by learning how to es-
tablish those networks, Sidman and his
students contribute richly both to the
cultivation of competencies by their
subjects and, more generally, to an un-
derstanding of real-world human be-
havior.
Geschwind's (1965a, 1965b) neuro-
logical perspective emphasized the
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close linkage betweencross-modal
equivalencesandlanguage,andposited
thatcross-modal(i.e., auditory-visual)
equivalencesmake languagein its
mostbasicform possible.In response
to this hypothesis,Sidmandesigneda
studyto demonstratewhetheror not
learnedauditory-visualequivalences
weresufficientfor readingcomprehen-
sionto emergewithoutexplicitinstruc-
tion in readingcomprehension.The
subject,mentally retarded,could al-
readymatchspokenwordsto pictures
andcouldevennamethemat the be-
ginningof theexperiment,buthecould
not read. Would establishmentof
equivalencebetweenspokenwords
andprintedwordsleadhim to reading
comprehension,and,givenhis ability
to namepictures,would auditory-vi-
sual word matchingprovide for the
emergenceof oralreading(p. 29)?
At this point the high excitement
thatcanbeassociatedwith researchis
vividly recounted.When the subject
did read, a wave of excitement washed
over those in the laboratory. Specific
sensory modalities were not germane
to reading. (Even Geschwind allowed
that deaf persons could learn to read.)
What was critical was that the subject
learn two sets of conditional discrimi-
nations in a manner that supported the
emergence of new conditional discrim-
inations (p. 35). And although Sidman,
in support of the behavioral tradition,
discounted the importance of media-
tional theory, it was in response to
Geschwind's theory that new discov-
eries were made--those that provided
the foundation for the rest of Sidman's
book.
In my view, Sidman recounts all too
casually the profound change in his
perspective on learning. In his view,
the matching-to-sample procedures he
employed were basic to the establish-
ment of equivalence relations "among
features of the environment" (p. 37,
italics added). Accordingly, Sidman
concluded that, "stimulus-response re-
lations therefore gave way in later pub-
lications to the more descriptively ac-
curate stimulus-stimulus relations, and
the relatively sterile notion of connec-
tion gave way to the productively de-
fined equivalence relation" (p. 37).
Psychologists have only one option
for answering questions, and that is by
measuring behavior. In a functional
analysis it is the source of behavioral
control that is the essential issue. Not-
withstanding, the assumption that be-
havior is controlled by relations be-
tween stimuli, responses, or both ap-
pears to signal a profound shift in per-
spective from the earlier dependence
on the three-term contingency (stimu-
lus-response-reinforcer).
Later in the book, however, Sidman
concludes that equivalence relations
emerge because of the natural conse-
quences of reinforcement and that this
"is consistent with a conception of
equivalence as a primitive function,"
(p. 389). Instead of discounting the
three- or even an n-term contingency,
he builds a new perspective of what it
can produce--and that is the formation
of equivalence classes and relations be-
tween stimuli and stimuli, between re-
sponses and responses, and between
stimuli and responses as well. He even
allows that "Discriminative stimuli, for
example, will function as reinforcers
and reinforcers will function as dis-
criminative stimuli" (p. 393). In so do-
ing, he strives to account for the "first
instances" of behavior, how adaptation
afforded by learning can extend in
novel ways to new contexts and envi-
ronments, and how the specification of
contingencies by rules comes about (p.
567), as posited by Skinner.
Sidman's view is, then, that rein-
forcement has far more comprehensive
consequences than just increasing the
probability that a response will occur
upon the presentation of a discrimina-
tive stimulus. Instead, reinforcement
enables the emergence of equivalence
relations, from which the meanings of
stimulus events can be established and
from which inductive inferences are
made possible.
And here a puzzling question must
be addressed. Particularly in the last
portions of his book, as Sidman port-
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dersthe originsof stimulusrelations,
he even considers"that the equiva-
lencerelation,like therelationswecall
reinforcementanddiscrimination,is a
productof survivalcontingencies"(p.
388), and '*thatwe form equivalence
relationsbecausewe are built that
way" (p. 389). Sidmanhas trouble
with concludingthatequivalencerela-
tionsareestablishedby someacquired
or newly learned response,which
mightbe named"equivalencing."He
questionshowtheequivalencingof ex-
emplarsthatshareonly commonrela-
tionscouldemerge"in theabsenceof
a highly complexverbal repertoire,"
onenot possessedby peoplewith se-
verementalretardation,or by animals.
Notwithstanding,theydo form.How?
Why?
Sidmanrejectsequivalencing,rela-
tional frames,and mediationas ac-
ceptablemeansof accountingfor stim-
ulusrelationsandassertsthat thereis
sufficientexplanationin the observa-
tion that "equivalencerelationsin be-
haviorare instancesof the classthat
elementarymathematicalset theory
describes" (p. 558). Sidmanargues
that theparallelsbetweenequivalence
relationsandelementarymathematical
settheory(whichincludestheconcepts
of identity,symmetry,andtransitivity)
are sufficientto their explanation(p.
553). But he also recognizesthat al-
though"Elementarymathematicalset
theorydescribestheabstractproperties
of equivalencerelations"andis of val-
uein determiningwhether"any partic-
ular eventpair belongsto an equiva-
lencerelation,it is silentabouttheor-
igin of equivalencerelations them-
selves"(p. 553).
Sidmanalsoappropriatelyobserves,
however,thattestsfor equivalencere-
lationsdo notconstitutedefinitionsof
their requisitesor an explanationof
them. They only declaretheir exis-
tence.He rejectsmediationaltheories
asawkwardandconsidersthemto be
"inelegant"effortsthatrelyuponvery
fragile props.For instance,he argues
that mediationaitheorycould not ac-
countfor AB andBC symmetrywith-
out "acceptingtherealityof backward
conditioning,"whichat bestis anun-
commonphenomenonor mechanism(p. 380).
Sidman,in thefinal analysis,attrib-
utesthe originsof equivalenceto the
naturalprocessesof reinforcement(p.
553). But one might well ask, rein-
forcement of what? There is no
"equivalence"responsein the tradi-
tional senseto be reinforcedduring
training. Although equivalencerela-
tionsdo emerge,they areneitherob-
viouslynordirectlyreinforcedassuch
duringtraining,duringwhichtimeoth-
er veryspecificresponsesare,indeed,
selectivelyreintbrced.
Thebasicequivalenceparadigmaf-
fords the subjectfeedbackand rein-
forcementfor very specific choices
duringtraining,but the test is not for
those choices! Rather, tests for equiv-
alence look for new choices, ones
seemingly quite foreign to the training
regimen. The tests for equivalence re-
lations entail presentations of stimuli
that were the options for conditional
choice during reinforced training. In
tests of equivalence, correct choices
are novel; hence, they have never been
reinforced during training.
In my view, the retrieval dimension
for these novel responses is not to be
found in changed values of some spe-
cific dimension (i.e., brightness) com-
monly used in studies of stimulus gen-
eralization, but, rather, apparently in a
relation generated by operations of the
subject's brain. Sidman accounts for
this apparent dilemma by arguing that
the traditional differentiations between
stimuli and responses and even rein-
forcers do not apply to equivalence
classes and relations, for they can in-
clude any or all of them as elements
(p. 377). At this point, it is helpful to
review and consider at least some of
Sidman's other perspectives.
Sidman argues that "no additional
experience on the part of the individual
need be invoked in order to account for
the observation that the components of
a reinforcement contingency are relat-
ed by equivalence" (p. 553). "The
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problem... becomes... how to ex-
plain those particular instancesin
which someor all of the eventsin-
volvedin a reinforcementcontingency
fail to become members of the same
equivalence class" (p. 554, italics add-
ed). The arguments of Hayes' (1992)
relational frame theory and of James
and Hakes' (1965) strategy of media-
tion are examined and then supplanted
with an argument of his own.
Sidman does not believe that "stim-
ulus control is best characterized as a
linear process or structure" (p. 539).
Neither does he argue that an element
necessarily must belong to only one
equivalence relation (p. 543).
Particular discriminations.., give rise to the ab-
straction of commonalities, often expressed in
linguistic forms--words. From these words, we
derive higher-order abstractions, a thought pro-
cess that itself becomes available to us via
equivalence relations, it is equivalence relations
that make purely verbal constructions possible--
words or phrases that have no immediate refer-
ents except for words or phrases. (p. 552)
Yet the role of language in equiva-
lence relations is itself controversial (p.
362). Sidman views the successful
work on stimulus relations reported by
Schusterman and Kastak (1993) with a
sea lion, in which it passed tests of
identity, symmetry, and transitivity,
and thus demonstrated equivalence, as
very important to resolution of the is-
sue. Schusterman and Kastak conclude
that language is not a likely requisite
for equivalence relations. Rather, they
view equivalence relations as a requi-
site for language. They also hold that
general intelligence is a requisite both
for language and equivalence relations,
a view shared by Savage-Rumbaugh
(1986) and myself (Rumbaugh & Sav-
age-Rumbaugh, 1994). Rumbaugh (in
press) reports a high positive correla-
tion between amount of additional
brain afforded by encephalization and
the probability that increased training
will result in positive rather than neg-
ative transfer among primates in gen-
eral.
Animal species (including humans)
have their own unique evolutionary
histories, a point acknowledged by
Sidman. But on the next points, we
might have some differences: I doubt
that species are passive systems that
simplistically service the contingencies
of the environment without introducing
their own biases of operation. Brains of
different species likely have evolved to
be differentially selective in their pro-
cessing of sensory and perceptual in-
put, and are likely well "designed" to
"file, organize, and retrieve" lessons
of the past in a manner so that they
might generate new, creative, and
adaptive responses to challenges of the
present. (Sidman would not disagree
with the last point.) Thus, it is reason-
able to anticipate that brain function,
notably in the primates, has, in large
measure, evolved in ways that enable
reinforcement and Sidman's elementa-
ry mathematical set theory to work in
the manner that affords the bases for
equivalence relations. But this is tan-
tamount to asserting that equivalence
relations emerge because of the struc-
ture and function of animal--and even
human--brains. We know that enceph-
alization, the disproportionate increase
in brain size relative to body size (Jer-
ison, 1985), appears to have enhanced
the complex learning skills of animals
and notably of primates (of which hu-
mans are one form). We also know that
very early experience and prior learn-
ing play important roles in the forma-
tion of stimulus relations. Thus, it is
the totality of the organism, nonhuman
or human animal--not just reinforce-
ment contingencies--that enables the
emergence of stimulus relations.
Sidman's altered perspective is a
major one. Because emphasis shifts
from stimulus control to the emergence
of relations between stimuli, many psy-
chologists will view it as a break with
traditional behaviorism, although Sid-
man appears not to view it that way.
Indeed, he reports that his work on
equivalence occurred before he related
it to Skinner's formulations (p. 570).
Nevertheless, the shift is reminiscent of
the mid-century running debates be-
tween Hull and Tolman. For Hull, the
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explicationof learningentailedstimu-
lus-responsemodelsandtheformation
of connectionsbetweenstimuliandre-
sponses.By sharpcontrast,Tolmanar-
guedfor stimulus-stimulusmodelsof
learning,and for him therewasmore
thanonekindof learning.ForTolman,
learningwasperceptualandcognitive.
It producedrelationsamongstimuli
(i.e.,cognitivemaps)andalsobetween
stimuliandresponses(i.e.,means-ends
relations).
JustasSidmanandhisassociatesat
timesfound their enthusiasmandjoy
in researchoverwhelming,1mustcon-
fessthatI, too,wasovercomewith joy
asI readof Sidman'salteredperspec-
tive. AlthoughSidmaneschewscog-
nitivemodels,hisworkexplicatesphe-
nomenathat othersview ascognition.(Tolmanwould smile, althoughHuH
wouldscowl!)
Sidmanlucidlyconveysbothhis line
of logicandtheresearchthatit engen-
dered.His researchdefinestheparam-
eterswithin which humancompeten-
cies can be developedand refined,
evenwhenmentalretardationandsen-
sory deficienciesmight constrainthe
learner.A basicbarrierto understand-
ing whatthe learnerhaslearnedrests
in ourexpectationsaboutwhatsubjects
can and cannotaccomplish.Too fre-
quentlyit appearsthatwhatthesubject
learnsis bothequatedto andapparent-
ly constrainedby measurementsys-
temsthat have a limited focus. But
looking deeper,one can find exactly
what Sidmandid--the emergenceof
new conditionaldiscriminations.To
detectsuchoutcomes,novel testcon-
ditionsgenerallyarerequired.
Referenceto a serendipitousfinding
from our laboratoryis offeredto illus-
trate the point. Sidman'sprocedures
typically entail the presentationof
StimulusA coupledwith thesubject's
learningto chooseStimulus B, fol-
lowed by the subject's learning to
chooseStimulusC in associationwith
thepresentationof StimulusB.These-
rial presentation of stimuli and choices
is germane to Sidman's procedures.
Emergent relations form. By contrast,
David A. Washburn and I reported a
project with rhesus monkeys presented
pairs of numerals from the set 0
through 9 (Washburn & Rumbaugh,
1991). All choices except for 0 were
reinforced, If the subject on a given tri-
al saw 5 paired with 3 and chose 5, it
would get five pellets. If it chose 3, it
would get three pellets. (Pellets were
delivered arrhythmically and were
promptly eaten, in turn, by the monkey
as they were delivered by the pellet
dispenser.) From a reinforcement per-
spective, it was a win-win situation.
All choices other than 0 were rein-
forced, although some received more
reinforcers than others. The monkeys
rapidly came to preferentially respond
to the numeral of higher pellet value.
Seven possible pairings of numerals
had been held back from training for
the purposes of a final test to determine
whether the monkeys had learned (a)
which specific numeral from each spe-
cific pair of numerals, with which they
had worked, netted the greater quantity
of pellets, or whether perhaps (b) they
could learn control by "relative val-
ues'" that would allow them to opti-
mize pellets received even with novel
pairings of numerals. They could--and
did! One monkey chose the higher nu-
meral without exception, and the sec-
ond made only two errors. To use Sid-
man's expression, stimulus relations
were established experimentally--one
between each numeral and the quantity
of pellets to be delivered by its choice.
Transitivity was inherent in the mon-
keys' successful test performances.
There was no pressure for them to
learn to do so either by the operations
of privation or by nonreintorcement if
the numeral of lesser value was select-
ed, other than what was inherent in the
reinforcement values of different quan-
tities of pellets that were associated
with the various numbers, but they did
so. After final tests with the novel pair-
ings of numerals, both monkeys man-
ifested a high sensitivity to the ranked
values of numerals presented in ran-
dom selections or groups of five at a
time. Their first choice was for the
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highestnumber,thenthenexthighest,
and so on until the set hadbeenex-
hausted.For eachselection,regardless
of theorderin which it wasselected,
the subject receivedan appropriate
quantityof pellets.Hadtheirsensitivity
for suchrankedpreferencesof num-
bersfrom setsof five not beentested
for, wewouldhavemissedit. But be-
causeweview(a)thebrain,andin par-
ticulartheprimatebrain,ashavingon-
going functionsthat organizeand in-
terrelate experiencesof the present
with thoseof thepastand(b) theprod-
uctsof thosefunctionsasselectivede-
terminersof what is learned,hence
availablefor productiveand adaptive
usein novelsituations,we lookedfor
generalizedcompetencein our mon-
keys,andfound it. In sum, the sources
of control of behavior are not always
evident in the environment, and por-
tions of them can be established by
functions of the brain that have been
selected for because of their value in
survival and reproduction. What else
the monkeys might have learned that
we failed to test for is a moot point.
Clearly the monkeys were sensitive to
the overall relations between the pellet
values of the numerals 0 through 9,
and not just to the specific contingen-
cies (i.e., quantity of pellets) associated
with each choice.
To us it was surprising, but clear,
that our subjects' brains were more
than sufficient to the challenge afford-
ed by our number program. They not
only learned, but also learned relation-
ally, and far more than the contingen-
cies of the task required. Our rhesus
monkeys learned the relations between
quantities and numerals and, in turn,
came forth with new dimensions of re-
lations between stimuli--ones that pro-
vided for optimal choice in novel tests.
It bears emphasis that the monkeys
learned the complex relations between
the numerals and their ordinally ranked
values in a situation in which they
could have done exceedingly well sim-
ply by choosing either number of each
pair presented and by avoiding 0 when
it was an option. How many pellets the
monkeys got per trial also was seem-
ingly of little consequence, at least
from our perspective, in view of the
fact that they were not deprived and
trials were massed. More pellets were
but a second away. (Subsequent re-
search demonstrated that the relational
learning occurred even without 0 as an
option.)
At least two points of procedure
contrast our study with monkeys and
Sidman's study with children. One is
that we did not present stimuli serially.
The second is that all responses other
than to 0 were reinforced, although
with different numbers of pellets.
Thus, the emergence of complex or-
dering relations, to use his term, ap-
pears not to be contingent upon the se-
rial presentation of A, B, and C stimuli.
Neither do they appear to be contin-
gent upon the subject receiving no re-
inforcement for some choices.
Although our study is behavior, our
subjects are very much alive and their
brains are presumed to do much more
than simply accommodate input-output
systems of stimuli and responses. Our
working assumption is that what they
learn, and hence how they learn, is
never simple. Frankly, I believe that
my view that the brains of many ani-
mals, and primates in particular, have
been selected via evolutionary pres-
sures to organize (e.g., relate) sensory
and perceptual input and to coordinate
those, in turn, with response systems
for successful adaptation appears to be
far more compatible with Sidman's
view than I had earlier thought. The
only major point on which I suspect we
disagree regards the specific role of re-
inforcement.
All of us agree that reinforcement is
important and has a profound influence
on what animals (including humans)
do. Sidman views reinforcement as
having two forms--primary and con-
ditioned. Primary reinforcers are the
"terminal events in operant and Pav-
Iovian conditioning, whereas condi-
tioned reinforcers acquire their rein-
forcing function" (p. 391). If Sidman
is to attribute the complexities of
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equivalencerelationsto reinforcement,
its preciseroleandfeaturesgainmore
significancethan is containedin the
traditionaldefinitionthat holdsthat a
reinforcerisanythingthatincreasesthe
probabilityof aresponse.Bothanimals
andpeopleareknownto learnhighly
complex things from observation
alone,whererespondingis difficult to
describe.Observingwhatanotherdoes
cannotbeequatedwith thepressingof
a bar.And what is the reinforcement
for suchlearning?
Is it necessaryto posit thatif there
has been learning,there must have
beenreinforcement?If onecan't find
thereinforcer,asin observational(not
imitativeor copycat)learning,is it de-
fensibleto insistthatit mustbesome-
thing,somewhere?I don't thinkso.To
dosocankeepusfrom observingand
understandingstill other aspectsof
learningandbehaviorchange.
The evidenceis overwhelmingthat
humans,andat leastsomenonhuman
species,can learnfrom first-instance
opportunitiesto observe.They can
learnby watchingothersdothingsand
byperceivingtheflowof eventsacross
time,therebyestablishingstimulusre-
lationsthat aresubjectto differential
recallanddifferentialaction.In short,
if Sidrnanis correctin attributingthe
formationof equivalencerelationsto
naturalcontingenciesof reinforcement,
thenreinforcementwill haveto bede-
fined as somethingmore ubiquitous
and subtle than are the eventsand
items of reinforcementhat are dis-
cretelydispensedin theoperantlabo-
ratory.
The animal researchliterature is
nowrepletewitharicharrayof studies
that portray emergentrelations be-
tweenstimuli that, in turn, allow for
the competentuse of languageand
numbersin apes(Rumbaugh,in press;
Rumbaugh& Savage-Rumbaugh,1994,
for areview;Savage-Rumbaugh,1986;
Savage-Rumbaugh& Lewin, 1994)
andevenin "insightful" problemsolv-
ing by birds.All psychologists,even
goingbackto K6hler,acknowledgethe
critical influenceof contextandexpe-
rience upon the emergenceof new
competencies, whether they are termed
insight, learning set, or something else.
Sidman calls them equivalence rela-
tions and posits that they emerge with-
in the contingencies of everyday life.
In science it is always proper to re-
examine basic tenets. It is timely that
psychology reexamine the definitions
of stimulus, response, and even rein-
forcement, as Sidman has done in sub-
stantial measure in his book. How we
go about our science declares its form
and its validity. The salience of the
stimulus, the salience of the response,
and the functionally pragmatic influ-
ence of the reinforcer have served his-
torically to capture the attention of
behaviorally oriented psychologists.
Although the history of our field has
concentrated upon the three-term con-
tingency (i.e., stimulus-response-rein-
forcement), our research subjects tell
us that many kinds of learning, es-
pecially the more complex kinds en-
tailed in the instantiation of cultural
competence, are not limited to these
terms.
The study of equivalence relations
can encourage the emergence of new
perspectives that are more symbiotic
than competitive. In full acknowledg-
ment of the important role and contri-
butions made by those who identify
themselves as experimental analysts of
behavior, it is timely that rapproche-
ments be worked toward, as indeed
they are, to meld that perspective with
others of our time. Sidman's book is a
masterful account of his saga in re-
search for understanding in the field of
equivalence relations. To me, if not
also to Sidman, there are implications
for how our subjects' roles in experi-
ments are to be viewed. Here it should
be emphasized that the comparative-
development framework can help us to
understand the dimensions of brain
evolution and development that enable
the emergence of equivalence relations
and relational frames of all sorts.
Both our research methods and our
expectations about the nature of the
learning process and the abilities of our
374 DUANE M. RUMBAUGH
subjectscandelimit what they might
learnandwhatwe,in turn,learnabout
their learning.If thebehavioranalyst
is lookingonly for a changein a re-
sponse,it is likely that only that will
be measured.If theanalystis looking
for emergentrelations,noveltestswill
haveto bedesignedandincludedin the
researchprotocol.As theserelations
arediscerned,it is goodto remember
that they arenot responsesthat were
corrector reinforcedduring training.
Neitheris the stimuluscontrollingbe-
haviorduringtrainingtheonecontrol-
ling behaviorin the test if the prior
training proceduresenabledthe for-
mationof equivalencerelations.In the
manifestationof equivalencerelations,
thereis neitherstimulusnorsymbolin
the traditionalsense.Rather,that to
whichthesubjectcomesto respondbe-
causeof equivalencerelationsis some-
thing new--a relationamongstimuli,
responses,or both.Justhow thebrain
functionsin the formationof equiva-
lencerelations,alongwith othertypes
of learning,is presentlyunclearand
promisesto remainunclearsufficient
to our earlyunderstandingof stimulus
relations.This,however,doesnotkeep
us from defining the antecedentsof
suchlearning.
As Sidman'sbook shows,sucha
perspectivedirects our attention to
questionsregardingthe subjects'abil-
ities andthe topics that capturetheir
attention.Underoptimalconditions,as
notedby Sidman,eventheconstraints
normallyattendingmentalretardation
did not keep subjectsfrom learning
much,muchmore "than anyonehad
previously succeededin teaching
them" (p. 43). Complexlearningcan
be exclusivelyaboutthe relationsbe-
tween stimuli and environmental
events.In my view,theserelationsare
notnecessarilydependentupontheop-
erationsof reinforcers,at leastnot in
the samemannerthat they appearto
affecttheshapingandoccasion for mo-
tor learning and performance. And it is
reasonable to anticipate that the same
procedures that result in nothing more
than the establishment of stimulus con-
trol over a response in one kind of sub-
ject population (i.e., per species and
developmental levels) might engender
complex, hierarchically organized
stimulus equivalence relations in oth-
ers. Operations do not necessarily en-
tail the same consequences (Rumbaugh
& Pate, 1984) for all subjects or for all
species.
Conditioned responses, in a sense,
also emerge from experiences, as do
stimulus relations. For stimulus rela-
tions, however, brain complexity
(Rumbaugh, in press) is relatively
more important, a point with which
Sidman would likely agree (p. 567).
Responses are conditioned, but capac-
ities for complex learning are the prod-
ucts of evolution and are subject to be-
ing cultivated or structured in various
directions, generally by protracted his-
tories of experiences or rearing. Com-
petence for complex learning is not es-
tablished by conditioning.
At the outset of procedures in which
responses are to be conditioned, at
least elemental parts of the target re-
sponse might be seen. By contrast, the
potential or the capacities that are req-
uisite for the emergence of equivalence
relations, though posited, can never be
seen. Notwithstanding, it is fruitful to
posit their existence.
Eventually, bright subjects, be they
human or nonhuman, appear to learn
everything about everything, and that
learning probably entails complex re-
lations among stimuli and among re-
sponses and is unlikely to be con-
strained to single, specific responses.
In the flatworm, although the condi-
tioning of responses is possible, the
emergence of equivalence relations
would be most unlikely. And although
one can condition the loci to which a
pigeon will home, one does not estab-
lish homing by reinforcing it as though
it were a motor response. Homing is
not a response, but rather is a geneti-
cally dictated capacity or potential that
characterizes some species, although
not in identical ways.
Most of us are satisfied to become
journey-persons in our research and
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scholarship. A few among us become
masters. Sidman is masterful through-
out his book, where his mission is to
communicate the joys, sorrows, frus-
trations, and excitement of research,
while also opening up to other behav-
ior analysts and teachers the profound
merits of new paradigms for teaching
new competencies in those students
whose learning is compromised by
mental retardation. Although the struc-
tures of his experiments and arguments
are complex, they are conveyed clear-
ly. He faces questions and counterar-
guments squarely. His answers have
the force of conviction and are com-
pelling. His work provides a sterling
model to be emulated by others.
The text will be of great value for
instruction at the upper-division and
graduate levels. Its impact will be sub-
stantial, for it defines an important ad-
vance in our efforts to understand the
richness of behavior in both humans
and nonhuman animals. Although not
presented to that end, the book might
also serve to bridge communications
with other groups of animal research-
ers whose interests lie more in a com-
parative or ethological framework. Sid-
man's research and perspective are
timely, yet overdue. Were it the case
that the genius of his book had been
available to psychology 20 years ago!
That said, his book is now before us--
neatly, honestly, bravely, and wisely
presented. All behavior analysts, pres-
ent and future, should study it in detail,
because it presents both a model and a
road map for a successful future for the
experimental analysis of behavior, a fu-
ture in which no one need fear, "What
would happen if astronomers tried to
decree it unlawful to talk about sun-
sets?" (For the behavioral meaning of
this question posed by Sidman, read
his book and, in particular, p. 571.)
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